Blind quantum computation allows a client without enough quantum technologies to delegate her quantum computation to quantum server, while keeping her input, output and algorithm secure. In this paper, we propose a universal single-server and classical-client blind quantum computation protocol based on entanglement swapping technology. In our protocol, the client interface with only one server and the only ability of the client requires is to get particles from trusted center and forward them to the server. Moreover, the protocol can be modified to make client completely classical by improving the ability of the trusted center. Numbers of blind quantum computation protocols have been presented in recent years, including single-, double-and triple-server protocols. In the single-server protocol, client needs to prepare single qubits. Though client can be classical in the double-server protocol, the two servers, who share Bell state from trusted center, are not allowed to communicate with each other. Recently, the triple-server protocol solves the noncommunication problem. Three servers, however, make the implementation of the computation sophisticated and unrealistic. Since it is impossible for blind quantum computation with only classical client and single server, blind quantum computation may work in the "Cloud + E-commerce" style in the future. Our protocol might become a key ingredient for real-life application in the first generation of quantum computations. Quantum computation has been considered to solve tough computation problems for classical computers with the development of quantum technology [1] [2] [3] . Although vast technological developments have already allowed for small-scale quantum computers with photonic, ionic, solid-state, and superconducting systems, it may be a long way to build large-scale quantum computers because the hurdles encountered in realizing quantum devices are enormous at present. The intrinsic technical complexity result in the use of the first-generation quantum computers being likely to "cloud" style [4] . A limited number of costly and powerful quantum servers will be only available in remote academia, corporations, and governments. A great number of clients, who have no enough quantum technology, have to delegate their quantum computations to the quantum servers. The security of client's information is extremely significant in this model. It should be guaranteed that the server (Bob) learns nothing about the inputs, outputs, or desired computation of the client (Alice). Then blind quantum computation (BQC) was put forward to meet the requirements.
Blind quantum computation allows a client without enough quantum technologies to delegate her quantum computation to quantum server, while keeping her input, output and algorithm secure. In this paper, we propose a universal single-server and classical-client blind quantum computation protocol based on entanglement swapping technology. In our protocol, the client interface with only one server and the only ability of the client requires is to get particles from trusted center and forward them to the server. Moreover, the protocol can be modified to make client completely classical by improving the ability of the trusted center. Numbers of blind quantum computation protocols have been presented in recent years, including single-, double-and triple-server protocols. In the single-server protocol, client needs to prepare single qubits. Though client can be classical in the double-server protocol, the two servers, who share Bell state from trusted center, are not allowed to communicate with each other. Recently, the triple-server protocol solves the noncommunication problem. Three servers, however, make the implementation of the computation sophisticated and unrealistic. Since it is impossible for blind quantum computation with only classical client and single server, blind quantum computation may work in the "Cloud + E-commerce" style in the future. Our protocol might become a key ingredient for real-life application in the first generation of quantum computations. Quantum computation has been considered to solve tough computation problems for classical computers with the development of quantum technology [1] [2] [3] . Although vast technological developments have already allowed for small-scale quantum computers with photonic, ionic, solid-state, and superconducting systems, it may be a long way to build large-scale quantum computers because the hurdles encountered in realizing quantum devices are enormous at present. The intrinsic technical complexity result in the use of the first-generation quantum computers being likely to "cloud" style [4] . A limited number of costly and powerful quantum servers will be only available in remote academia, corporations, and governments. A great number of clients, who have no enough quantum technology, have to delegate their quantum computations to the quantum servers. The security of client's information is extremely significant in this model. It should be guaranteed that the server (Bob) learns nothing about the inputs, outputs, or desired computation of the client (Alice). Then blind quantum computation (BQC) was put forward to meet the requirements.
Based on quantum circuit model, Childs presented the first BQC protocol [5] where Alice needs to have quantum memory and the ability to perform SWAP gate. Arrighi and Salvail proposed another BQC protocol [6] where Alice needs to prepare and measure multiqubit entangled states. This protocol is not a universal one which is only for the calculation of certain classical function, and Bob can obtain some information if he does not mind being caught. Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi (BFK) presented the first universal BQC protocol [7] which does not require any quantum computation power or memory on the client's side. The client only needs to be able to generate single qubits, and her information can be unconditionally secure. Inspired by this, various BQC protocols have been proposed, such as the protocol based on the Afflick-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki state [8] [9] [10] , continuous-variable measurement-based quantum computation [11, 12] , and the ancilla-driven model [13, 14] .
In the above BQC protocols, the client needs to possess some quantum resource or technology, such as the ability to own quantum memory, generate quantum qubit, or perform measurement. The BFK BQC protocol can be modified to a double-server protocol [7] , where Alice can be completely classical if the two servers who share Bell pairs do not communicate with each other. Morimea and Fujii showed that entanglement distillation in the double-server scheme does not degrading the security of blind quantum computing [15] . However, the two servers are not allowed to communicate in both of the two modified protocols. Recently, Li et al. [16] showed that the noncommunicable requirement between the two servers can be removed if one more server can be imported. The triple-server BQC protocol is based on the technique of entanglement swapping [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] , and the three servers are allowed to communicate with each other and the client is almost classical, which only needs to be able to get access to quantum channel. However, it is complex and unrealistic that a client needs to interact with up to three quantum servers. In this paper, we will show that only one quantum sever is enough to implement the quantum computation, where the client can be classical and keep her information private. Based on this protocol and Ref. [22] , we propose a new "Cloud + E-commerce" style for blind quantum computation, in this way classical clients can acquire quantum computation conveniently.
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Before proceeding to our protocol, let us briefly review the BFK BQC protocol in Ref. [7] , modified double-server BQC protocol in Ref. [15] and triple-server BQC protocol in Ref. [16] first. Suppose that the client Alice needs to implement quantum computation on the m-qubit graph state corresponding to the graph G. The quantum operation that Alice wants to perform is to measure the ith qubit in the basis {|0 ± e iφi |1 }, where φ i ∈ S ≡ {kπ/4|k = 0, 1, ..., 7}. The BFK protocol can be depicted as follows. (S1) Alice generates m qubits m i=1 |θ i and sends them to Bob, where |θ i = |0 + e iθi |1 and θ i is randomly selected from the set S. (S2) Alice informs the graph G to Bob. (S3) According to the graph G, Bob creates a brickwork state |G(θ) by applying CTRL-Z gates between the qubits from Alice . (S4) If Alice wants Bob to measure the ith qubit (i = 1, 2, ..., m) of |G(θ) , she sends δ i ≡ θ i + φ i + r i π to Bob, where r i ∈ {0, 1} is randomly selected by Alice and φ i is a modification of φ i that depends on the previous measurement outcomes. (S5) Bob measures the ith qubit in the basis {|±δ i } and sends Alice the measurement result.
The BFK single-sever BQC protocol [7] shows that Bob cannot get any information about Alice's input, output, or algorithm, but Alice has to be able to prepare single qubits. To solve this problem, this protocol was modified to a double-server BQC protocol [7, 15] in which Alice can be completely classical.
In the double-server BQC protocol [7, 15] , classical client, Alice, can delegate her quantum computation to two quantum servers, Bob1 and Bob2, who share Bell pairs but cannot communicate with each other. Without entanglement distillation, the double-server BQC protocol in Ref. [15] can be depicted as follows. [7] with Bob2,
Although it is great to learn that client could be classical in double-server protocol, the noncommunication problem between the two servers makes the protocol less practical. In order to solve this problem, Li et al. [16] proposed a triple-sever BQC protocol.
Three quantum servers can communicate with each other and almost classical client, who only need to be capable of getting access to quantum channels, can delegate her quantum computation to quantum servers while keeping her data private, in the triple-server BQC protocol in Ref. [16] . The procedure can be shown as follows (see also Fig. 1 ). (T1) A trusted center prepares n = (2+ δ)m (δ is some fixed number) Bell pairs |ψ 0,0 (B1 k , A k ) = |00 + |11 (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) and distributes them to Bob1 and Alice respectively. The trusted center prepares another n Bell pairs |ψ 0,0 (B2 l , A l ) and distributes them to Bob2 and Alice respectively. (T2) Alice randomly transmits the particles A k , A l to Bob3 and records the position of them, or throws them away. (T3) Bob3 gets 2m particles from Alice, which are A s1 , A s2 , ..., A sm and A s1 , A s2 , ..., A sm . Bob3 implements Bell state measurement on the particles and sends the outcome (z si , x si ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 to Alice. (T4) Alice learns that Bob1 and Bob2 share m i=1 |ψ zs i ,xs i (B1 si , B2 ti ) according to the measurement outcome (z si , x si ). (T5) Alice sends n clas-
homogeneously distributed over all the eight elements of the set S. The technology of entanglement swapping [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] in our protocol, which is also used in the triple-sever protocol, plays a crucial role. As one of the most significant technology of quantum mechanic, entanglement swapping is an essential resource of quantum information application, such as quantum teleportation [23, 24] , quantum dense coding [25] , quantum repeaters [26, 27] , and quantum cryptography [28, 29] . Entanglement swapping allows two or more independent entangled systems to build up entanglement to each other by switching their photons. We will harness the measurement result of the swapping of two EPR pairs and the state of entangled pairs after measurement in this protocol.
The four Bell states are denoted by |ψ z,x = (I ⊗ X x Z z )(|0 |0 + |1 |1 )/ √ 2, where (z, x) ∈ {0, 1} 2 , X = |0 1| + |1 0|, and Z = |0 0| − |1 1|. Suppose there are two EPR pairs (a, b) and (a , b ), they are in the Bell states |ψ z,x a,b and |ψ z ,x a ,b , respectively. If we perform joint measurement on particles b (a) and b (a ) in the Bell basis [30] , the particles a (b) and a (b ) would be entangled and the combined state of them is one of the four Bell states which is determined by the result of the joint measurement outcome.
In our protocol, we will use the EPR pairs |ψ 0,0 = (|00 + |11 )/ √ 2 to perform entanglement swapping. In the following, we will take two EPR pairs |ψ We can learn that the state of (a, a ) ((b, b )) will collapse to the corresponding one of the four Bell states if (b, b ) ((a, a )) is measured. For example, if (b, b ) is measured in Bell basis and the result is (0, 1), the state of (a, a ) will collapse to |ψ 0,1 .
We propose the single-server BQC protocol where Alice can perform her quantum computation on one quantum server Bob and keep her input, output and algorithm private. Alice does not need any quantum power, such as quantum memory, performing SWAP gate, or the ability to generate any quantum state, what she need is to be capable of getting access to quantum channel. Suppose that Alice wants to perform the same quantum computation as that in the three BQC protocols reviewed above. The protocol can be depicted in steps as follows (see also Fig. 2) .
Step 1 A trusted center prepares 2n, n = (2+δ)m (δ > 0 is some fixed number), Bell states, |ψ 0,0 (B k , A k ) (k = 1, 2, · · · , 2n), and distributes the particles B k of each Bell state to Bob. After Bob gets all the particles, the center distributes the other particles A k to Alice.
Step 2 Alice randomly forwards the particles A k to Bob and records the position of them, or simply discards them. Bob places these particles in quantum registers following the incoming sequence.
Step 3 The probability that at least 2m particles are sent by Alice is high if the protocol is not aborted. Suppose the 2m particles are A s1 , A s2 , · · · , A sm and A t1 , A t2 , · · · , A tm , where 1 ≤ s i ≤ n < t i ≤ 2n, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}. Alice notifies Bob to perform Bell state measurements on particles A si and A tj , (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m} and gives their positions in the sequence of the particles which are from Alice. Bob implements measurement on the particles and submits the outcome (z si , x tj ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 to Alice.
Step 4 Based on the measurement outcome (z si , x tj ), where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, Alice gets the combined state of the corresponding particles B si and B tj , which are the particles that Bob gets from the trusted center, is |ψ zs i ,xt j (B si , B tj ) and the value of z si and x tj .
Step 5 Alice sends Bob n classical message {
, where θ k is randomly selected from the set S, (z k , x k ) is depended on Alice at step 4, and when k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} − {s 1 
2 and θ k ∈ S are selected to make
θ n homogeneously distributes over all the eight elements of the set S, which plays a crucial role in the security of the protocol.
Step 6 Bob measures his first n qubits which are from the trusted center in the basis {± ∼ θ k }, {k = 1, 2, · · · , n}, and sends the measurement outcome {b k } n k=1 to Alice. Alice simply keeps the result (b s1 , b s2 , · · · , b sm ) of the particles that are entangled with particles in another n qubits which are also from the trusted center.
Step 7 Alice sends classical message {t j } m t=1 to Bob and notifies him only keeps particles {B tj } m t=1 . Bob relabels these particles as B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B m in order and the combined state of these particles is
Step 8 Alice and Bob start the BFK protocol from step 2, taking In the following, we will show that this protocol is as secure as the reviewed triple-sever BQC protocol, and Alice can detect if Bob is not cooperating with very high probability.
Alice sends Bob classical message
. Bob has the outcome (z si , x tj ), then he can get the combined state |ψ zs i ,xt j (B si , B tj ) , but he does not know which are the two corresponding 
Then Bob learns that the elements of S i are distributed unequally or take fewer than eight possibilities, which also makes the outcomes of Alice's θ si occur unequally or take less than eight possibilities. Of course, the possibilities of θ si are certainly fewer than eight if the size of n is less than eight. The probability that Bob can learn information about Alice's θ si is increased. Now, we focus on Alice's ability to detect if Bob sends her wrong measurement result in purpose. On the first step of the protocol, trusted center generates h decoy Bell states, |ψ z,x (A h1 .A h2 ) , where (z, x) ∈ {0, 1} 2 . The center sends the first particle of Bell states to Alice, and then send the other particles to her after she has received all the first particles, and tells her the state of these Bell states. In step 2, Alice randomly forwards the particles of decoy Bell states to Bob and records the position of it, or simply discard them. Bob places these particles in quantum registers following the incoming sequence. In step 3, suppose Alice asks Bob to perform Bell measurement on particles of l (l < h) decoy Bell states which are specified by Alice, and Bob sends result to Alice. Alice can check the result from Bob and the state information from trusted center. If Bob spoils, he will get caught with the probability 3/4 of every Bell state. He gets caught if Alice finds that at least one output is incorrect, so the probability of an incorrect output being accepted is 4 −l . The client requires the ability to get qubits from trusted center and forward them to quantum server in our protocol above. The client can be completely classical if the first two steps are changed as following:
Step 1 A trusted center prepares 2n, n = (2 + δ)m (δ > 0 is fixed number), Bell states, |ψ 0,0 (B k , A k ) (k = 1, 2, · · · , 2n), and distributes the particles B k of each Bell state to Bob. After Bob gets all the particles, the trusted center randomly selects particles from the second particles A k (k = 1, 2, . . . , 2n) and discards them, and sends the rest particles of A k to the server Bob.
Step 2 Trusted center notifies Alice which particles of A k are discarded and which are sent to Bob, and keeps this information secret to Bob.
Since it is impossible for blind quantum computation with only classical client and single server [22] , trusted center is essential if client is classical and only one server is involved. The role of trusted center in the future BQC protocol is similar to Certificate Authority(CA) in "E-commerce" today. CA is a trusted third party trusted both by the party who is the subject of the certificate and by the party who relies on the certificate, while trusted center in BQC protocol can be treated as a third party trusted both by classical clients and quantum servers. Therefore, the blind quantum computation may work in "Cloud + E-commerce" style, our single-server and classical-client blind quantum computation protocol might become a key ingredient of real-life application in the future. However, the security of E-commerce is computational security, while blind quantum computation is unconditionally security.
In conclusion, our protocol shows that by using the technology of entanglement swapping, the almost classical client, who does not require any quantum technology or resources and only needs to be able to receive and send qubits, can delegate quantum computation to one quantum server, while keeping the input, output and algorithm private. Our protocol is as security as the tripleserver protocol, and only one server is required which makes it easier to implement and more practical. The client is completely classical if trusted center helps client to send particles to server and tells client which particles are sent or discarded. To consider the practical application, the "Cloud + E-commerce" style may be worked for blind quantum computation in the first generation of quantum computations.
